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Abstract
Recently, the majority of visual trackers adopt Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) as their backbone to achieve high
tracking accuracy. However, less attention has been paid to
the potential adversarial threats brought by CNN, including
Siamese network.
In this paper, we first analyze the existing vulnerabilities in
Siamese trackers and propose the requirements for a success-
ful adversarial attack. On this basis, we formulate the adver-
sarial generation problem and propose an end-to-end pipeline
to generate a perturbed texture map for the 3D object that
causes the trackers to fail. Finally, we conduct thorough ex-
periments to verify the effectiveness of our algorithm. Experi-
ment results show that adversarial examples generated by our
algorithm can successfully lower the tracking accuracy of vic-
tim trackers and even make them drift off. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work to generate 3D adversarial
examples on visual trackers.
Introduction
Visual object tracking, which aims at locating the trajectory
of a target in an image sequence given its initial state, is
one of the fundamental problems in computer vision. In re-
cent years, visual trackers have achieved great performance
improvement due to the application of Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN), a powerful tool for learning representations
of images(Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012). Among
these CNN based trackers, Siamese trackers(Zhu et al. 2018;
Li et al. 2018; Bertinetto et al. 2016; Valmadre et al. 2017;
Li and Zhang 2019; He et al. 2018) play an important role
due to its satisfactory balance in speed and accuracy, espe-
cially in short-term realtime tracking.
Despite the performance gaining, applying CNN will also
bring adversarial threats. Since the adversarial attack was
first introduced by Szegedy et al.(Szegedy et al. 2014), re-
searchers have proposed several robust and efficient attack
methods. These adversarial examples can not only unveil
potential threats in the networks but also help network de-
signers improve the robustness of networks. However, not
much attention has been paid to the adversarial threats in
visual tracking.
In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of adversarial
threats in visual tracking by generating adversarial exam-
ples over Siamese trackers. There are two main challenges
with generating adversarial examples for Siamese trackers:
(1) Siamese trackers use the first frame of the video se-
quences to initialize the network. Therefore, we need to
make the adversarial object not self-similar to achieve a
successful attack, while attacking other Siamese-based vi-
sual tasks like face recognition only requires the adversar-
ial object not to be similar to the original object. Suppress-
ing f(xadv, xadv) is much more difficult than f(xori, xadv)
when f is a Siamese network function. (2) A practical attack
on Siamese trackers requires the created perturbation keeps
consistent in the whole video sequence. Therefore, directly
applying adversarial attacks on image sequences is unrea-
sonable, considering about the uncertainties of viewing an-
gels, background settings and so on.
In this paper, we propose the Siamese Tracker Attack
(STA) algorithm, which can generate adversarial examples
over Siamese trackers. By analyzing the weaknesses of
Siamese trackers, we find that the excessive dependence on
the similarity score and the side-effect of the cosine window
penalty make Siamese trackers vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks on the similarity score. With a sufficiently low score,
the cosine window penalty will mislead Siamese trackers,
even make them completely drift off. To make our adversar-
ial examples practical, instead of directly applying STA on
2D video images, we design an end-to-end 3D texture gen-
eration pipeline to generate adversarial 3D objects. We also
adopt the Expectation Over Transformation (EOT) frame-
work (Athalye et al. 2018) and model the uncertainties of
viewing parameters within the optimization procedure. With
3D scenes and objects, the consistence of perturbation is nat-
urally maintained so that we can evaluate the effectiveness of
our algorithm from all viewing angles. In our experiments,
we successfully reduce the tracking accuracy of three state-
of-the-art Siamese trackers and even make them completely
drift off. In addition, our experiments indicate that the asym-
metrical network structure used in some Siamese trackers
will make them less robust to our attack.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We analyze the weaknesses of Siamese trackers, reveal-
ing that the over-dependence on similarity score, the co-
sine window penalty, and the asymmetrical region pro-
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posal subnetwork will bring potential adversarial treats to
Siamese trackers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that focuses on the adversarial threats to visual
trackers.
• On this basis, we propose STA algorithm, which generates
robust 3D adversarial examples over Siamese trackers. To
ensure the consistence of perturbations during the whole
video sequences, we design an end-to-end 3D generation
pipeline and build a 3D scene to produce video sequences
for evaluation.
• We evaluate our attacks on three typical Siamese trackers.
Results show that our adversarial examples successfully
reduce the accuracy and robustness of Siamese track-
ers, and even make them drift off completely. We hope
our analysis and attacks can provide some insights for
Siamese tracker designers to avoid the vulnerabilities of
Siamese trackers and improve their robustness.
Related Work
Siamese Networks based Tracking
Siamese trackers covert the tracking problem into a simi-
larity learning problem. They use the initial appearance of
the object as the exemplar image and try to locate the ex-
emplar image in a larger search image from frame to frame.
They apply an identical feature extraction to both the exem-
plar image and the search image, and then perform cross-
correlation on the feature maps to measure their similarity
in embedding space. The position of the maximum simi-
larity score indicates the position of the target. Benefiting
from avoiding online update for the deep network, Siamese
trackers achieve success in balancing between accuracy and
speed. It is notable that in VOT2018 Challenge(Kristan et al.
2018), eight of the top ten real-time short-term trackers are
based on Siamese network.
SiamFC(Bertinetto et al. 2016) is one of the pio-
neers(Held, Thrun, and Savarese 2016; Tao, Gavves, and
Smeulders 2016) that train a fully convolutional Siamese
network to locate an exemplar image within a larger search
image. Inherited from SiamFC, other Siamese trackers try
to enhance the tracking accuracy and robustness by improv-
ing their network structure. SiamVGG(Li and Zhang 2019)
observes that AlexNet only provides limited feature extrac-
tion capabilities for the Siamese network. To improve the
discrimination capability, it chooses the VGG-16(Simonyan
and Zisserman 2014) network as its backbone CNN. SA-
Siam(He et al. 2018) introduces a twofold Siamese net-
work which consists of a semantic branch and an appearance
branch. An attentional mechanism is used to make choices
between two folds. SiamRPN(Li et al. 2018) formulates the
tracking process as a local one-shot detection framework and
introduces a region proposal network (RPN) to generate ac-
curate region proposals. DaSiamRPN(Zhu et al. 2018) goes
one step further by tackling the imbalanced distribution of
training data. With effective training samples, DaSiamRPN
is capable of distinguishing semantically similar targets so
that it can be extended to perform long-term tracking.
Figure 1: We test Siam-FC, Siam-VGG and Da-SiamRPN
with a unperturbed car running on the bridge. Results show
that occlusion caused by columns on the bridge has little
effect on their tracking accuracy.
Robust Adversarial Attack
Recently, adversarial attack has shown its power on attack-
ing some computer vision tasks, including image classifi-
cation(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. 2017), object detection(Xie
et al. 2017) and semantic segmentation(Arnab, Miksik, and
Torr 2018; Xie et al. 2017). Follow-up works try to improve
the robustness of adversarial examples. Kurakin et al.(Ku-
rakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016) generates printing dig-
ital adversarial examples and proves that a large portion of
their adversarial examples fool the image classifier. Athalye
et al.(Athalye et al. 2018) transfers the attack models to 3D
objects. They point out that the 3D rendering and the un-
certainties of physical conditions should be modeled in the
optimization process. Their EOT framework models trans-
formations synthetically when generating adversarial per-
turbations and successfully attack an image classifier from
the full perspectives with an adversarial 3D-printed object.
Chen et al. (Chen et al. 2018) adapt EOT framework to ad-
versarial attacks for object detection. They generate adver-
sarial stop signs which successfully fool Faster R-CNN(Gir-
shick 2015). Eykholt et al. (Eykholt et al. 2018) propose
a general attack algorithm to train robust visual adversar-
ial road signs under various environmental conditions such
as different viewpoint. They also validate that their works
can effectively attack both image classifier and object de-
tector. Zhang et al.(Zhang et al. 2018) propose a framework
called CAMOU to learn a camouflage pattern that can hide
vehicles from being detected by state-of-the-art object de-
tectors. They use a clone neural network to substitute the
rendering engine and generate a camouflage that can mini-
mize car detection scores by Mask R-CNN(He et al. 2017)
and YOLOv3-SPP(Redmon and Farhadi 2018).
However, not enough attention has been paid to attack-
ing visual object trackers although visual object tracking is
a fundamental problem in many computer topics such as vi-
sual analysis, automatic driving and pose estimation.
Generating Adversarial Example
In this section, we first analyze the weaknesses of Siamese
trackers. On this basis, we present our Siamese Tracker At-
tack (STA) algorithm to generate robust adversarial 3D ob-
jects over Siamese trackers.
Table 1: In this table we show the score maps before and after cosine window penalty. For the unperturbed car and rabbit, their
scores (0.8/0.5 for the car/rabbit) are high enough so that they still keep highest after applying cosine window penalty. While
for the adversarial objects, since their scores are suppressed severely (0.32/0.075 for the car/rabbit), they no longer maintain
highest after applying cosine window penalty, leading to the failure of the tracker.
Model Image Score Map(before Cos)
Score Map
(after Cos) Image
Score Map
(before Cos)
Score Map
(after Cos)
Unperturbed
Object
Adversarial
Object
Siamese Tracker Vulnerability Analysis
Thanks to the powerful Siamese network and the large
training dataset, Siamese trackers can locate the target ro-
bustly, even in some challenging situations. As Fig 1 shows,
Siamese trackers successfully locate the target although it is
occluded by a column on the bridge.
However, there are some weaknesses in state-of-the-art
Siamese trackers:
Siamese trackers highly rely on similarity score to pre-
dict the target’s position. Other information like motion esti-
mation and shape deformation is neglected. Such excessive
dependence makes Siamese trackers vulnerable to adversar-
ial attacks on the similarity score. For traditional Siamese
trackers, although their complete symmetrical networks re-
strict us from suppressing the similarity score severely, we
can still make them less robust to some challenging situa-
tions such as occlusion and deformation. While for RPN-
based Siamese trackers, things get worse. Suffering from
their asymmetrical networks, their score can be suppressed
so severely that trackers can fail directly without any occlu-
sion or deformation.
Furthermore, Siamese trackers introduce cosine window
penalty to penalize the distractors that are far from the
center(Zhu et al. 2018). Without cosine window penalty,
Siamese trackers will be sensitive to any distractors or
noises. However, when we suppress the target’s score
through fabricating perturbed texture for the target, its side-
effect appears. The gap between targets’ score and back-
ground’s score will become so small that cosine window
will have a major impact on the final score and mislead the
tracker. What’s worse, when misleading happens, the tar-
get will be further away from the center of the cosine win-
dow, which will exaggerate the side-effect of cosine window
penalty and even make the tracker drift off completely.
As we can see in Table 1, for the unperturbed car and
rabbit, their scores are high enough so that they still keep
highest after applying cosine window penalty. While for the
adversarial objects, although their scores are still highest be-
fore applying cosine window penalty, it no longer maintains
after applying the cosine window penalty, which eventually
leads to the failure of Siamese trackers.
Here, we will have a quantitative analysis on how much
should we suppress the similarity score to achieve a success-
ful attack. Supposing target’s score is s, the score of the dis-
turbing position is s′, target’s distance from center is d, dis-
turbing position’s distance is d′, the penalty weight is c and
the total pixel number of score map is M , the final scores of
target and disturbing position in Siamese trackers are:
starget = (1− c) · s+ c · [0.5 + 0.5cos( 2pid
M − 1)]
sdispos = (1− c) · s′ + c · [0.5 + 0.5cos( 2pid
′
M − 1)]
(1)
To mislead the Siamese tracker, we need to make
sdispos > starget. Substitute the expression in this inequal-
ity, and we can get when ∆s = s− s′ < 0.5c1−c · [cos( 2pid
′
M−1 −
cos( 2pidM−1 ))], the disturbing position will be misjudged as
ground truth, leading to the failure of the Siamese trackers.
To sum up, a successful attack on Siamese trackers re-
quires us to suppress the similarity score of the adversarial
3D object. A sufficiently low similarity score, plus the side-
effect of cosine window penalty, will mislead the tracker and
even make the tracker completely drift off.
Siamese Tracker Attack
Based on the analysis above, we formulate the adversarial
generation problem and present STA algorithm to generate
robust adversarial 3D object over Siamese trackers.
Given a specific Siamese tracker, we use f(Iz, Ix) to de-
note its Siamese similarity scoring function. Since f mea-
sures the similarity in image space, we first use a differ-
entiable renderer to render the 3D object and get two im-
Figure 2: The forwarding pipeline of STA. We first use a differential renderer to render the 3D object into two images that both
contain the target. Then we send these two images to the Siamese network and get their similarity score. Through backward
propagation, STA generates the perturbed texture that minimizes the similarity score of the target.
ages that both contain the target. To make the target not
self-similar, we minimize the similarity score between them
through generating a perturbed texture for the 3D object.
Therefore, our optimizing model starts as:
arg min
o˜t
f(R(os, o˜t; p), R(os, o˜t; p)) (2)
where R(o; p) denotes a differentiable rendering process.
Let o = (os, ot) be the 3D object. os denotes its 3D-mesh
and ot denotes its texture. With a collection of viewing pa-
rameters p, such as camera distance, viewing angle, lighting
condition and solid background color, the 3D object is ren-
dered into two images and then sent to similarity function.
It is notable that during the tracking process, trackers will
scale the image to make sure that the size of the bounding
box, plus the context margin, is suitable for the Siamese
network. For example, in SiamFC, given a tight bounding
box with size (w, h), the amount of context is set to be
p = (w + h)/4. Siamese tracker will scale the image with
scaling factor s to make sure that s(w+2p)×s(h+2p) = A,
where A is the area of the exemplar images.
It has been well demonstrated that such process will re-
duce the effectiveness of adversarial examples(Akhtar and
Mian 2018). To overcome it, we imitate the same cropping
and scaling process to our rendering results before they are
sent to the similarity function. We use S to denote this pro-
cess and define T (o; p) = S(R(o; p)). Then the optimiza-
tion problem becomes:
arg min
o˜t
f(T (os, o˜t; p), T (os, o˜t; p)) (3)
In practice, the 3D objects we generate can be tracked
with different distances, angels, and scenes. To make our
adversarial examples robust under most physical conditions,
we adopt Expectation Over Transformation(EOT) frame-
work proposed by Athalye et al.(Athalye et al. 2018) and
model such uncertainties within our optimization process.
With a distribution of viewing parameters P , we can mini-
mize the score under expectation of distribution P . There-
fore, our optimization problem can be described as:
arg min
o˜t
Ep∼P [f(T (os, o˜t; p), T (os, o˜t; p))] (4)
Furthermore, we introduce the L2 distance between the
original texture map and the perturbed texture map to control
the perceptibility of our adversarial examples:
arg min
o˜t
Ep∼P [f(T (os, o˜t; p), T (os, o˜t; p))
+λ · ||o˜t − ot||2]
(5)
To keep the perturbed texture map valid, we apply Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) to ensure the the value of
the adversarial pixels is within [0, 1] and approximate the
gradient of the expected value by sampling the viewing pa-
rameters independently in each forward-backward calcula-
tion.
Attack RPN-based Trackers
Currently, state-of-the-art Siamese trackers like
SiamRPN(Li et al. 2018) and DaSiamRPN(Zhu et al.
2018) introduce Region Proposal Network (RPN) to im-
prove tracking accuracy. Different from traditional Siamese
trackers, these RPN-based trackers adopt a region proposal
subnetwork for proposal generation instead of straightly
performing correlation on feature maps. Unlike the simi-
larity score in traditional Siamese trackers, RPN gives the
foreground/background possibility for each anchor.
To generate adversarial examples for RPN-based track-
ers, we attack their classification branch via misleading it
to classify the target as background in all anchors. Based
on our STA framework, we use cross-entropy L as the ad-
versarial loss and the labels for all anchors y∗ are neg-
ative(background). Therefore, our optimization goal for
RPN-based Siamese tracker becomes:
arg min
o˜t
Ep∼P {L[f(T (os, o˜t; p), T (os, o˜t; p)), y∗]
+λ · ||o˜t − ot||2}
(6)
Experiments
In this section, we first describe the Siamese trackers, at-
tacking pipeline and evaluation metric we used in our exper-
Figure 3: 3D scene we build for evaluation. We set five
columns on the bridge to evaluate the robustness of Siamese
tracker. Occlusion happens when the car passes these
columns.
Figure 4: Adversarial cars generated by STA.
iment, and then we demonstrate how the adversarial exam-
ples we generate perform on three state-of-the-art Siamese
trackers. After that, we discuss the side-effect of asymmet-
rical structure in RPN-based Siamese tracker, proving that
this asymmetrical structure will reduce the robustness of the
Siamese tracker. Finally, we investigate the transferability
of the adversarial examples and try to generate one that can
confuse all Siamese trackers we test.
Experiment Setup
Software and Hardware Setup Since all three Siamese
trackers we attack have pytorch(Paszke et al. 2017) version,
we use it as the deep learning framework for all experiments.
Our experiments are performed on a Nvidia GTX1080Ti
GPU. In terms of the differentiable renderer, we use neural
3D mesh renderer proposed by Hiroharu Kato et al. (Kato,
Ushiku, and Harada 2018).
The Siamese Trackers We choose SiamFC(Bertinetto
et al. 2016), SiamVGG(Li and Zhang 2019) and DaSi-
amRPN(Zhu et al. 2018) as our attack targets. SiamFC is the
pioneer of Siamese trackers. Based on SiamFC, SiamVGG
changes the backbone network into a modified VGG-16 net-
work and achieve good results in VOT2018 challenge. These
two trackers are traditional trackers which have a complete
symmetrical structure. DaSiamRPN, an enhanced version of
SiamRPN(Li et al. 2018), is the champion of the real-time
short-term tracker in VOT2018. It represents the asymmet-
rical RPN-based trackers. We use the code released by its
authors.
Pipeline and Video Production Following the under-
standing of the problem we developed in previous sections,
Figure 5: IOUs (solid lines) and Scores (dot lines) in three
trackers. Red lines show the performance of original model
and blue lines show the performance of adversarial mod-
els. For all three trackers, our attacks successfully decrease
the similarity scores of the target. Also, we make these
three trackers no longer robust to occlusion. SiamFC and
SiamRPN completely drift off after the targets pass by the
first column. SiamVGG meets sharp decrease when the tar-
get is occluded by the columns.
we build a generator whose pipeline is shown in Figure
2. Furthermore, we build 3D scenes and produce 60-frame
videos for both the original objects and the adversarial ob-
jects. The 3D scene we build is shown in Figure 3. Occlusion
happens when the objects pass by the columns on the bridge.
Also, we mark down the ground truth in every frame. These
videos are sent to the corresponding tracker for evaluation.
Evaluation Metrics Three metrics are adopted to evalu-
ate the performance of adversarial examples we generate.
Two of them are quantitative. One is the drop of the high-
est similarity score since lowering target’s similarity score is
our direct attack goal. The other is the drop of Intersection
Over Union (IOU). IoU between a predicted region A and
the ground truth regionB is defined as IOU(A;B) = A∩BA∪B .
It basically measures the accuracy of trackers and is widely
used in popular video tracking benchmarks. Furthermore,
we also adopt whether can adversarial examples make track-
ers drift off as our qualitative evaluation metric.
Figure 6: From this viewing angle, the car will no be oc-
cluded by the columns on the bridge in the whole video se-
quences.
Attack Siamese Trackers
In this section, we evaluate the performance of STA on three
state-of-the-art Siamese trackers. Due to the limitation of
pages, we only present the adversarial car here. More re-
sults, including attacks on other objects and the video clips
we make can be found in the supplementary material. Fig-
ure 4 shows the adversarial examples generated by STA over
three trackers. We observe that although models generated
each time is different because of the randomness of view-
ing parameters, they seem to have a specific pattern accord-
ing to the tracker they attack. Specifically, the texture for
SiamFC looks like colorful spots on the car while textures
for SiamVGG and SiamRPN look like two kinds of wave
patterns on the car.
Figure 5 shows the comparison of IOUs (solid line) and
similarity scores (dot line) of three trackers. As is shown
in the figure, our attacks successfully decrease the simi-
larity scores of all three trackers. More important, our ad-
versarial examples make them no longer robust to occlu-
sion. When tracking the unperturbed car, all three trackers
can track the car successfully with insignificant vibration
in tracking accuracy. However, in terms of the adversarial
cars, SiamFC and DaSiamRPN drift off directly when the
car is occluded by the first column on the bridge. Although
SiamVGG shows better robustness that it does not drift off
in the whole video, its accuracy still meets sharp decrease
every time the adversarial car passes the columns on the
bridge. Five sharp decreases of IOU can be observed in the
result of SiamVGG, which correspond to five columns on
the bridge.
Asymmetrical Network Breeds Danger
According to the analysis before, to achieve a successful at-
tack, the similarity score has to be suppressed sufficiently.
Also, it is suggested that the asymmetrical structure of RPN-
based Siamese trackers breeds the possibility to suppress the
score severely. In this section, to prove the vulnerabilities
brought by this asymmetrical structure, we render the 3D
scene from another viewing angle. As is shown in figure 6,
the target car is not occluded in the whole video sequences
from this angle. Our goals is to test whether STA can make
SiamFC and DaSiamRPN fail without occlusion, under the
same hyper parameter settings.
Experiment results validate the vulnerability of this asym-
metrical structure. When we attack SiamFC, although we
can suppress the similarity score to some extent, we fail to
make it drift off in the whole video sequences. However, in
terms of DaSiamRPN, STA succeeds in making it drift off
without any occlusion.
Detail score maps in Table 2 can explain this result. As
we can see, the score of the adversarial target in SiamFC re-
mains highest after cosine window penalty because its sym-
metrical structure prevents its similarity score from severely
decreasing. While in terms of DaSiamRPN, the score of our
adversarial example is suppressed to be so low that it drowns
in the cosine window, leading to the failure of DaSiamRPN.
Transferability Experiment
In this section, we investigate the transferability of our ad-
versarial examples. To this end, we feed the adversarial ex-
amples we generate for each tracker to the other trackers.
For comparison, we also use these trackers to track a car
with totally random noise. Furthermore, we try to conduct
combining attack by using STA on three trackers iteratively
with a decreasing learning rate.
Table 3 indicates the lack of transferability of adversarial
examples generated by STA. The adversarial object we gen-
erate for one tracker fails to show noticeable effects on the
other two trackers. This result is not surprising since pre-
vious researchers has argued that high-confidence physical
attacks fail to transfer both in image recognition and object
detection(Liu et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2018).
In terms of combining attack, it works on these three
trackers. As results in columns 5-8 show, through applying
STA on three trackers iteratively with a decreasing learning
rate. We successfully fool three trackers with a single adver-
sarial object.
Discussion and Future Work
Perceptibility. In the course of our experiments, to generate
a robust adversarial 3D object, we use a very small λ so that
the perturbation of texture is quite perceptible, as we can see
in Figure 4. Although adversarial attacks over other tasks re-
quire perturbation to be unnoticeable, we think it acceptable
in this case since the shape of the object is kept and what
STA does can be considered as designing camouflages for
the objects.
Limits on Experiments. We have not evaluated our adver-
sarial examples in the physical world due to the financial
limitation. Also, state-of-the-art differentiable renderer still
cannot tackle complicated background and produce high-
resolution images, which limits the robustness of our adver-
sarial examples.
Furthermore, we do not attack popular video datasets such
as VOT and OTB because these datasets only provide 2D im-
age sequences. As is mentioned before, a practical attack on
video trackers can not be conducted with 2D images. A 3D
video tracking dataset or the 3D reconstruction technology
may be the possible solution.
Suggestions on Designing Siamese Trackers. First and the
most important, attentions should be paid to the side-effect
of cosine window penalty. In existing Siamese trackers, co-
sine window is located at the predicted position in the last
frame so that the target will always be punished by co-
sine window. Simply removing the cosine window penalty
will make trackers not robust to distractors or sharp noises.
Table 2: Results for SiamFC and DaSiamRPN. For SiamFC, although we successfully suppress its similarity score, we fail
to make it drift off since its similarity score is still high enough to overcome the side-effect of cosine window. However,
our adversarial object successfully fools DaSiamRPN without occlusion. Its score is suppressed to 0.1 so that it is no longer
recognized after cosine window penalty. (Range of score in DaSiamRPN is 0 to 1. In the same scene, the score of the original
model is 0.99)
SiamFC DaSiamRPN
Frame
No. Image
Scoremap
(before Cos)
Scoremap
(after Cos)
Frame
No. Image
Scoremap
(before Cos)
Scoremap
(after Cos)
5 5
7 7
9 9
Table 3: mIOU(%) results of transferability experiments. Columns 2-4 show how the adversarial examples generated from one
tracker perform on other trackers. Columns 5-8 show the effectiveness of combining attack.
Model Adversarial Examples Generated fromSiamFC(r1) SiamVGG(r2) DaSiamRPN(r3) r1+r2 r1+r3 r2+r3 r1+r2+r3 none random
SiamFC 17.44 83.83 86.24 10.07 31.66 87.68 10.3 82.78 83.36
SiamVGG 81.67 59.42 87.9 66.73 79.76 75.75 76.69 86.99 86.27
DaSiamRPN 58.06 58.14 13.7 58.66 14.91 14.76 14.71 58.98 56.74
Therefore, it is suggested to improve the location of the co-
sine window using motion estimation. With more accurate
center, the side-effect of cosine window can be eased. Also,
a completely symmetrical network structure is suggested for
Siamese trackers because of its robustness to adversarial at-
tacks.
Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrate the potential adversarial
threats on Siamese trackers and propose STA algorithm to
generate adversarial 3D objects over three state-of-the-art
Siamese trackers. Experiment results show that our adver-
sarial examples successfully decrease their tracking accu-
racy and even make them drift off completely. Furthermore,
the asymmetrical structure of RPN-based Siamese trackers
makes them easier to be attacked.
To conclude, the over-dependence on similarity score, the
side-effect of existing cosine window penalty, and the asym-
metrical region proposal subnetwork will make Siamese
trackers less robust to adversarial attacks, which is suggested
to be considered by Siamese tracker designers.
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